

February 1968
2000 Hrs EST

3 Feb

TO: [REDACTED]

(b) (6)
OGA

FM: NSACC

REF: Question 7

There was no indication in SIGINT that the defensive posture in the vicinity of Wo'nsan was any higher at the time of the incident than it had been [REDACTED]. The state of readiness in reference to the NKAF prior to the Pueblo capture was also as it has been [REDACTED]. North Korea continues to maintain a high state of readiness through 2 February.

(b) (1)
(b) (3)-50 USC 403
(b) (3)-18 USC 798
(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

B/K file

SECRET



DIA will call

(b) (6)
OGA

on these

Secure phone 51

Response to these questions must be in JCS J-3, Attention General Steakley prior to 0800 4 February 1968.

QUESTIONS TO BE ANSWERED:

✓ 1. What U.S. and ROK forces, Army, Navy and Air Force were available, to assist USS Pueblo? What was their state of alert, readiness and disposition?

2. What US forces were available in Japan and Okinawa to assist Pueblo? What was their state of alert, readiness and disposition? What would have been their reaction time?

✓ 3. What was the communication circuit from Pueblo through the chain of command? What relays are required and what is the expected delay when messages require relay? Include in this response both Genser and SSO nets.

4. How many guns were operational on Pueblo? Were the installed guns loaded? What other ordnance was on board? What is on the Banner?

5. USS Banner has been harassed on previous missions. What action did Banner take on these occasions?

6. U.S. intelligence and other ships operate in other areas around the world. What has been the nature and extent of their harassment?

✓ 7. There are indications that the North Korean defense posture in the vicinity of Wonsan was extremely high. Is that true? By what means was this determined? What state of readiness was the North Korean Air Force immediately prior to and during the capture of Pueblo? What is the current state of alert and readiness?

FOR GEN STEAKLEY

0800 4 FEB 68

SECRET